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ABSTRACT

Making Choices Real: Increasing Electoral
Participation By Voting for None
by

Shanna S. Phillips
Dr. Timothy Fackler, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Political Science
University of Nevada. Las Vegas

W hile Nevada legislators have consistently changed Nevada’s election
laws in order to keep up with the advance o f modem society, there are several
problems with Nevada’s election rules. I intend to discuss reforms that could
increase the effectiveness o f the “none o f these candidates’* law in Nevada.
First, I w ill assess the need for a binding “none o f these candidates” law since the
1970’s. I w ill track patterns of electoral participation so that I can assess the
impact o f Nevada’s electoral laws on the voters o f our state. Next, I w ill define
the problems with Nevada's electoral structure and address the theoretical
reasons that make a binding version o f “none o f these candidates” necessary, i
w ill conclude by addressing different ways to get a binding version o f the “none o f
these candidates” law adopted in Nevada and throughout the United States.

Ill
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
W hile Nevada legislators have consistently changed Nevada's election
laws in order to keep up with the advance of modem society, there are several
problems with Nevada's election rules. I w ill demonstrate that we have reached
a critical juncture in Nevada's history where a sm all change could significantly
improve our electoral system. This is not to say that the current system is
inherently flawed, but instead that our system could be improved in a way that
would make it more democratic.

Research Questions
I intend to discuss a reform that could increase the effectiveness of
Nevada's electoral system. The binding “none o f these candidates” option that I
propose w ill act as a partial solution to Nevada’s poor tumout and lack o f trust in
public officiais. There are a host o f proposals fo r campaign finance reform, term
lim its and other types o f reform that can be discussed with reference to each
specific problem that t w ill address, but a binding “none o f these candidates” law
is the only single piece o f legislation that can bring us one step closer to solving
all o f these problems simultaneously. The binding “none o f these candidates"
law cannot solve a ll o f Nevada's problems, but it is certainty a step in the right
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direction. Nevada’s current “none o f the above" statute is impotent when dealing
with these issues because it is not binding on the players that it seeks to restrain,
but a binding version o f the statute offers some hope fo r improvement The
current law exists as only a token reform that has little im pact on which candidate
is elected to office.
In the following chapter, I w ill assess the need for a binding “none of these
candidates" law since the 1970’s by framing the issue in the context in which it
was originally adopted. I w ill further explain the nuances o f the existing law and
the changes that a binding “none o f these candidates” law would make. In the
second chapter, I w ill define the problems with Nevada’s electoral structure and
address the theoretical reasons that make a binding version o f “none of these
candidates” necessary. I w ill also elaborate on specific problems caused by
Nevada’s electoral procedures and discuss how this reform could improve the
effectiveness o f Nevada’s electoral process. Chapter three w ill discuss specific
vices that contribute to electoral problems and methods that a binding version of
“none o f these candidates” would employ to control these vices. I w ill conclude
by addressing different ways to get a binding version o f the “none o f these
candidates” law adopted in Nevada and throughout the United States.

Purpose o f the Study
Careful analysis o f an existing law requires more than ju st a reading o f the
statute. We have to consider the context in which laws were made and the
problems that these laws sought to address in order to fu lly appreciate the intent
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o f existing legislation. It is easy for us to understand the motivation o f a legislator
when a problem is resolved, but existing laws that have not successfully resolved
problems are still worthy o f academic analysis. Through the analysis and
refinement of unsuccessful laws, we uncover strategies to change those laws so
that they become successful in achieving their goals. The “none o f these
candidates” law fits well within the boundaries o f this category. W hile “none of
these candidates” has not successfully resolved the problem o f distrust that it
sought to redress, this legislation is worthy o f academic analysis because review
o f the law may lead to the development o f reforms that can accomplish the goals
o f the existing legislation.
In the m idst o f the W atergate scandal, the Nevada legislature adopted the
“none o f these candidates” law to increase trust fo r public officials. The act was
passed to smooth over differences between elected officials and their
constituents during a time when contempt for politicians was rampant. The law
required that “none o f these candidates” must appear below the list o f candidate
names in every statewide race. Legisiators thought that they could earn back the
public's trust by adopting an unprecedented policy that demonstrated the
worthiness of the government establishment.
When state assemblyman Don Mello first proposed the “none o f these
candidates” law, the Las Veaas Sun printed an editorial boasting that “it is
entirely possible that in one sim ple stroke, Mello h it upon a scheme that w ill do
more to bring about economy and efficiency in office than all the ^ n c y election
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reform proposals combined” (“Frustrated Voters,” 1975)/ Unfortunately, the
m erits o f the bill were soon compromised by two sacrifices that were made to
secure its adoption. The “none o f these candidates” law challenged the public to
vote fo r “none o f the above” when candidates are not worthy of public office, but
the state assembly ensured that the public would not take full advantage of the
legislation by amending the bill to include a clause stating that “none of these
candidates" can never win an election (Journal o f the Assemblv. 1975).^ This
amendment changed the legislation so that “none o f these candidates” acted as
an actual candidate solely for documentation purposes without changing the
results o f the election. After amending the bill, the assembly voted 34 to 3 in
favor o f its adoption.^ While this concession had to be made in order to secure a
m ajority vote, Mello’s original legislation provided fo r a more equitable solution
for voters who choose “none of the above” instead o f another candidate.
Adoption in the Nevada senate required further concessions to be made.
After the first reading o f the bill, senators voted to “indefinitely postpone”
consideration o f the bill, but the measure was reconsidered a week later when
Chairman Gibson o f the Senate Government Affairs Committee noted that “there
was no representation from the sponsors of the bill” (Minutes of Senate Meetings
30 and 3 3 .1975).* The attending senators voted unanimously to reconsider the

^ “Frustrated Voters May Get a Choice," Las Vegas Sun. 12 March 1975.
^ Nevada General Assembly, Journal of the Assembly. Fifty-eighth Session, 26 March
1975 (Carson City, 1975), 454-455.
^ Nevada General Assembly, Journal of the Assembly. Fifty-eighth Session, 26 March
1975 (Carson City, 1975), 111,489. Two members of the assembly were absent at the time that
the vote was taken. Another memberwas present, but refused to vote on the bill.
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bill in the absence o f its sponsors. The only debate that took place in the senate
dealt with whether the “none of these candidates” law should apply to elected
judges and local officials. The senate amended the legislation to apply only to
statewide offices (including seats in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of
Representatives) and the bill was sent back to the assembly for approval. There
is little doubt that Nevada senators created the statewide office limitation to avoid
running against “none o f these candidates” in the next election. Legislators
adopted the current “none of these candidates” law as a symbolic, token reform
to enhance public relations without endangering their likelihood for reelection.
They watered down the law because they wanted the public to vote them back
into office in the next election.
Nevada is currently the only state that gives voters the option of choosing
“none o f these candidates” in every statewide race, but there are two serious
problems with Nevada's law. First, Nevada’s law is not binding in cases where
“none o f these candidates” wins the election. Nevada’s “none o f these
candidates” law is the equivalent of a vote for a losing candidate because it does
not change the results o f the election. In two elections immediately following
Nevada’s 1976 adoption o f the “none o f these candidates” law, both of Nevada’s
Republican congressional primaries were won by “none of these candidates.” In
the fou r cases where “none o f the above” has won a statewide primary election,

* Nevada Senate, Government Affiaîrs Committee, Minutes of Meeting No. 30—Aorit 10.
1975. (Carson City, 1975), 2.
Nevada Senate, Govemment Affiairs Committee, Minutes of Meeting No. 33—Aorii 17.
1975. (Carson City, 1975), 2.
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the second place candidates were still given the victo ry/ “Its as if the secondplace finisher at this years Olympic games was awarded the Gold Medal,”
commented the Wall Street Journal (19 9 6 )/
Next, Nevada’s law does not mandate the appearance of “none o f these
candidates” in every political race. Since the state gained a second
congressional seat in 1980, “none of these candidates” no longer appears on any
of Nevada’s congressional ballots. The “none of these candidates” option also
does not appear next to candidate names in the bulk o f Nevada’s political races
because o f the “statewide office” lim itation. In 1996, there were only fourteen
statewide offices, but there were sixty-five local offices.^ Even though term s for
these offices are staggered so that we w ill never vote fo r all seventy-nine offices

^ “None of these candidates” (16,097 votes) won the 1976 republican congressional
primary against Anthony Dart (8,097) and Walden Charles Earhart (9,831). Earhart was awarded
the republican nomination for the office of U.S. Representative, but he lost the general election to
democratic incumbent congressman Jim Santini. “None of these candidates” (18,383) beat
Earhart (16,599) again in the republican primary for secretary of state in 1978. George Cotton
(9,168) also lost to “none of these candidates” in the 1978 republican primary for secretary of
state. Earhart was awarded the victory, but he lost the general election race to the incumbent
secretary of state William D. Swackhamer. During the 1978 republican primary, “none of these
candidates” (15,441) also beat three candidates for the office of republican congressman—Bill
O'Mara (14,610), Martin Hoffenblum (2,982) and Sam Cavnar (13,102). O’Mara was awarded the
victory in the primary, but he lost the congressional race to incumbent congressman Jim Santini
in the general election. The only victory for “none of these candidates” in a democratic primary
occurred in the 1986 race for state treasurer when “none ofthese candidates” (19,891) beat five
other candidates running for the office. Patrick M. FitzPatrick (18,389) was awarded the victory
against Nadean Reed (15,245), John Chrissinger (13,065), Stan Knight (8,498) and Harold L
Singer (6,710) in the primary, but republican Ken Santor beat FitzPatrick in the general election.
° “Give Voters a Real Choice,” in the W all Street Joumal. par. 1 [Lkd. What is Binding
None o f the Above?! (3 June 1996 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World W ide Web @
httDVyWww.nader96.ora/Wsi.htm
^ For the purposes of this paper, local offices will refer only to those offices listed in
Secretary of State Dean Heller's Political History o f Nevada 1996. These offices include two
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, eleven members of the Board of Regents, eleven
members o f the State Board of Education, and forty-one districtjudges.
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in one election, local offices constitute the bulk o f the offices on the ballot in any
election.
The intentions of state assemblyman Don Mello were noble even though
these compromises led to an ineffective, token reform. In spite o f numerous
political scandals, elected officials wanted to demonstrate that they were worthy
o f being trusted without actually putting their jobs on the line. The law
exemplifies the power of the public to make legislators feel that they need to
prove their integrity, but the law did not carry enough weight to achieve its
primary objective because it is not binding on candidates when “none of these
candidates” wins a plurality o f the votes. W hile there is some m erit to the
legislatures argument that “none o f these candidates" is not an actual candidate
and therefore cannot hold public office, there is another option called binding
“none o f the above.”

Definition o f Terms
“None of the above” (NOTA) can occur in two forms: binding and non
binding. A non-binding version o f “none o f these candidates” offers voters the
option o f choosing NOTA on the ballot, but awards the victory to the second
place candidate when NOTA wins the race. In this scenario, it is possible to help
the person you like the least (the second place candidate) win the election by
voting fo r NOTA instead o f voting fo r the lesser o f two evils. This is the version
o f “none o f these candidates” that we have in Nevada. A binding version o f
NOTA offers voters the option o f choosing NOTA on the ballot, but it does not
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declare the second place candidate the winner in the event that NOTA wins the
election. Instead o f giving the victory to a candidate that did not win a plurality of
the votes, the binding version of NOTA forces the state to hold a special election
to fill the vacancy within one month o f the original election. Candidates that lose
to NOTA in the first election are not eligible to have th e ir names on the ballot in
the special election. Losing candidates are ineligible because the voters have
already chosen not to elect those candidates to public office.
One popular variation of the “none of these candidates” law Is called
preferential “none o f the above.” Preferential NOTA can be used by states that
employ either the binding or non-binding versions o f the “none of these
candidates” law. The preferential method allows voters three options: (1) only
select their favored candidate, (2) only select “none o f the above” or (3) select
“none o f the above” in conjunction with a candidate name so that votes are not
wasted in cases where NOTA fails to win the election. Caltfomia’s None o f the
Above Voter Empowerment Act would have allowed the use of preferential
NOTA, but it failed to secure a m ajority vote in the March 2000 election. NOTA
advocates estimate tha t organizations in as many as fifteen states are
considering initiatives to get preferential “none o f the above” on the ballot (Wood,
1997).® “This flavor o f NOTA would not force you to throw away your vote to
express dissatis^ction,” says Washington state NOTA advocate John Murray,

“ Ibid.
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“you can vote fo r a candidate and also say you'd rather have ‘none o f the above’"
(1999)/
W hile election software upgrades would be necessary to count multiple
votes, preferential NOTA advocates feel that the cost o f upgrading the counting
and reporting systems In various states would be outweighed by the benefits of
the new ballot option. Critics often point to the costs of a special election and the
lack of high quality candidates as their primary objections to NOTA. W hile it is
true that an additional election would cost taxpayers more money, the extra
money would be well spent if citizens were rewarded with good govemment
“None of these candidates” has won four primary elections since Its adoption in
1976, but plurality rules did not apply to those races because the second place
candidates were awarded the political offices in those races. A special election
due to NOTA would not be any more costly than run-off elections paid for in other
states when no candidate receives a majority o f the votes. Eleven states held
run-off elections in 1998 because candidates did noteam at least 51% o f the
popular vote. The extra election did not cause undue economic hardship in
these states. Instead, the run-off election provided citizens with an extra
opportunity to forge a consensus about which candidate was favored among the
populace.
NOTA operates on the same principal. When “none o f these candidates"
places higher than the other candidates for political office, a special election is

^John R. Murray, “An Alternate from Washington State,” [Lkd. Voters for “None of the
Above”! [cited 2 July 1999!; available from Worid Wide Web @
http://heD.phvsics.wisc.edu/inb/nota altemate html
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held to determine which candidate should assume the duties of that political
office. This process cannot ensure that a m ajority of citizens w ill vote in favor of
one candidate or the other, but the extra election increases the probability o f
such a result. Afresh lis t o f candidate names would be generated for the run-off
election to give voters better alternatives than the candidates in the original
election. The candidates from the original election would not be eligible to run in
the special election because voters have already chosen not to elect those
candidates to public office. The only exception to this rule would be that losing
candidates from other political races could run for the vacant office in the special
election. The person with a plurality of the votes in the special election would
assume the office because “none of these candidates” would not appear on the
ballot in the special election.
It is unlikely that voters would use the NOTA option frivolously because
the special election results would be final. There would not be an option for
NOTA in the special election. Nevada has employed a non-binding version o f
NOTA fo r nearly twenty-five years, but NOTA has only taken firs t place in a
handful o f elections. We should expect more frequent use o f NOTA if we employ
a binding version o f the law, but increased use would not be destructive to
electoral politics or the state’s economy. Citizens may resolve to exercise their
option to vote for NOTA in several races immediately after the passage o f such a
law, but this is a small price to pay for democracy. The threat o f using NOTA
should be enough to change the way that politicians behave by making them
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more accountable to their constituents (Pitney, T h e Right to Vote No," 1994)/°
If politicians are willing to clean up their act, they w ill not need to worry about
whether or not NOTA could be used against them or about whether or not NOTA
w ill be overused in general.
NOTA opponents argue that parties w ilt not be able to find candidates to
run in the second election, but this is unlikely because second place candidates
from other political races would be eligible to run in the special election. Often,
the best candidates on the ballot are running against each other in the same
political race. For instance, a binding "none o f these candidates” law could have
had a dram atic im pact over the 1998 congressional races in Nevada. Senior
Senator Harry Reid pulled out a narrow victory over the powerful Representative
John Ensign in the 1998 Nevada senate race. Meanwhile, two relative
unknowns. Shelly Berkley and Don Chairez, battled for the seat in the House o f
Representatives that Ensign vacated. Assuming that Nevada had a binding
NOTA system and the race fo r Ensign's open seat had resulted in a victory fo r
"none o f the above,” Ensign would have been able to use the special election to
run fo r re-election to his seat in the House o f Representatives after losing the
senate race to Reid. In Federalist 10. James Madison established that our
founding fathers intended to provide an electoral system in which those
candidates "who possess the most attractive merit, and the m ost diffusive and
established characters” would be elected to office to represent the people

Pitney, T h e Right to Vote No,* par. 17.
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(Pitney, “The Right to Vote No,” 1994)/^ A binding “none o f these candidates”
law would secure a place fo r losing candidates who possess the merit and desire
to get elected to other offices by offering voters a chance to restructure candidate
lists in the special election. This process would ensure that voters retain the
most valuable candidates and dispose o f the least worthy candidates by
choosing “none o f the above.” A binding “none of these candidates” law would
allow voters to send candidates a message waming them to improve when
candidates are not meeting the standards that the electorate desires. This is a
fa r cry from the system that we have now, but binding NOTA offers the possibility
o f an electoral system that is truly based on merit.

Special Election Details
Critics have charged that special elections unintentionally favor candidates
who lose races in the original election because the public is already ^m ilia r with
their candidacies, but this perceived inequality is no different from that
experienced whenever losing candidates campaign in future elections. The goal
o f the special election is to find the best potential candidates to sen/e the public.
It would be counterproductive to elim inate suitable candidates simply because
the public knows them better than the other candidates.
The rules fo r special general elections would vary slightly from the rules
fo r special primary elections. In the event that NOTA wins a plurality o f the votes

" Daniel B. Wood. “Golden State Solution fbr Disgruntled Voters?” In The Christian
Science Monitor, par. 2 (electronic newsgroup! (10 E>ecemt)er 1997 [cited 10 February 19991):
available from World Wide Web http://Www.csmonitor.eom/durable/1997/12/10/us/us.5.httTil
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in a general election race, the special election would consist of two elections—a
special primary election to nominate a new list o f candidates from each political
party and a special general election to determine the winner of the vacant post
In cases where NOTA wins a plurality o f the votes during a primary election, a
special primary election would be held within one month o f the original primary,
but the general election would be held on the regularly scheduled date.
In order to maximize voter tum out and minimize the costs o f the special
election, all special elections would be conducted using the vote-by-mail form at
Opponents have criticized the mail-in election format on grounds that it
encourages the laziest portion of the electorate to vote and it increases election
fraud, but widespread use o f the vote-by-mail format in Oregon has proven
othenwise. Oregon has been using the m ail-in election form at since 1987 for
many of the state's local and special elections (Southwell and Burchett, 1997).^^
Upon the October 1995 resignation o f Oregon Senator Bob Packwood, the state
conducted a closely monitored special election using the vote-by-mail form at to
find Packwood's successor. The 1996 Oregon Senate election was the firs t
federal election to require the exclusive use o f mail-in ballots.^®
In order to analyze the impact o f the vote-by-mail form at on election
retums, surveys were mailed to the Oregon electorate along with their ballots.

Priscilla L. Southwell and Justin Burchett, “Survey of Vote-By-Mail Senate Election in
the State of Oregon* in PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 30, no. 1,53, par. 7 [electronic
newsgroup} (March 1997 [cited 27 April 1999]); available from B randed Academic ASAP @
http://web2.searchbank.comyttw/sesslon/785/98/12668033w5/26{mltview&amlc 1 2
Ibid., par. 1.
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Follow-up surveys were also given by telephone and through the m ail/*
Scholars found that 77% o f the Oregon electorate favored voting through the
mail, usually because voting-by-mail was more convenient and less time
consuming/® W hile one out o f four voters reported that another person was in
the room while they were filling out their ballot, only three people reported that
“the presence o f another person made them feel pressured to vote a certain way"
and only one person reported that his/her vote changed as a result of pressure
from another person in the room/® Since 99.7% o f those surveyed reported no
perceived pressure to change their vote, Oregon’s vote-by-mail format retained
the freedom o f choice associated with traditional votng.^^
Even though analysis o f the Oregon results revealed a higher incidence o f
non-partisan voting, election results are not likely to be altered by the vote-bymail format^® According to the Oregon study, “partisan advantage is virtually
non-existent under vote-by-mail" and “the outcome o f the 1996 special Senate
election appears to have been unaffected by the electoral form at”^® The use of
the vote-by-mail form at in Nevada’s special elections should yield results sim ilar
to those experienced in Oregon.

Ibid., par. 12.
" Ibid., Table I.
Ibid., Table II.
" Ibid., Table II, par. 28.
Ibid., par. 20.
Ibid., par. 29.
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Significance o f the Study
There is a movement building among at least fifteen states to get binding
preference NOTA on the ballot (Wood, 1997)/° Gary Hoover o f the Free
Congress Foundation suggests that:
Many voters would embrace the idea of NOTA. In 1990,52 percent
of Texas voters told the Gallup poll that, if possible, they would
have voted fo r NOTA instead o f either gubernatorial candidate
Republican Clayton W illiams or Democrat Ann Richards. Louisiana
voters would have welcomed the option to vote fo r NOTA in their
1991 race fo r govemor between the bom-again Nazi David Duke
and the crim inal Edwin Edwards. In a Mason-Dixon poll taken just
before the vote, 66 percent o f the Louisiana voters wished the state
had a “None o f the Above” line on its ballot In a hypothetical runoff
election against Duke and Edwards, NOTA finished with 30 percent
o f the vote. Ironically, just months before that election, the
Louisiana legislature rejected a proposal to add NOTA to the state's
ballots (Hoover, 1993).^^
The Louisiana race that forced voters to chose between “form er KKK leader”
David Duke and “ethically-challenged” Edwin Edwards was “dubbed the wizard
versus the lizard” because it typifies the dilemma voters face when they are
forced to chose between two unworthy candidates (Washington State Campaign
for Democracy, 1998).^ W hy should voters have to choose between two evils?
Voters see NOTA as a vehicle for positive change in govemm ent If an
unopposed incumbent casts an unpopular vote in the months ju st before an

“ Wood. par. 3.
Gaty Hoover, “None o f the Above—The People’s Veto,” in Policy Insights, par.7 [online
journal] vol.521 (December 1993 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World Wide Web @
httDilWwvy.nota.org/bi521.htm
^ “None of the Above,” par. 6 [Lkd. Washington State Campaign for Democracy—
Preference None o f the Above (NOTA)] [cited 27 April 1999]; available from World Wide Web @
httoi/Wwvy.nader96.ora/bnota.htm
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election, why not vote fo r the “none o f the above” line on the ballot? According to
Common Cause, this scenario is not unlikely since, “79 Congressmen were
running without major party opposition when the bipartisan' budget bill, which
contained tax increases, was considered right before the election” (Lilienthal,
1996).^ At that time, voters were faced with the choice o f casting their ballot for
the lesser of two evils or not voting at all. Binding preference NOTA would allow
voters to express their dissatisfaction with the candidates on the ballot without
wasting their votes.
Voters may also need NOTA when a scandal is uncovered in the weeks
ju st before an election. In 1996, Oregon’s voters found out that republican Wes
Cooley had allegedly falsified his war record and altered the date on his marriage
certificate. Sources confirm that, “in the primary, Cooley was unopposed, but
more blank ballots and write-ins were cast than votes for his renomination”
(Lilienthal, 1996).^^ Eventually, the Oregon State GOP persuaded Cooley to
resign, but NOTA would have given voters, instead o f party leaders, the
opportunity to choose whether Cooley's name should appear on the ballot in the
general election. Daniel Wood o f the Christian Science M onitor compares “none
o f the above” to a police officer driving in traffic because his presence “affects the

^ Steve Lilienthal, "None of the Above’ on Pennsylvania Election Ballots: That Way if
You Don’t Like the Choices You Still Have a Choice.” in In Depth, par. 4 [Lkd. None o f the
Above—In Depthj (1996 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World Wide Web @
htto://Wwvy.nota.ora/niienthal.html
“ Ibid.
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law-abiding behavior o f all drivers within view,” ju st as the presence o f NOTA
would affect the behavior of every candidate on the ballot (1997).^®
“None o f the above” is gaining momentum on both sides o f the ideological
spectrum. Ralph Nader, Nation magazine and The Boston Globe support NOTA
on the left side o f the political spectrum while the W all Street Joumal and the
Manchester Union-Leader support NOTA on the right (Hoover, 1993).^® Political
scientists like Curtis Gans, head o f the Committee for Study o f the American
Electorate, and Seymour Martin Lipset o f Stanford University’s Hoover Institution
have also voiced their support fo r binding “none o f the above” (Hoover, 1993).^^
According to Claremont McKenna Govemment Professor John J. Pitney Jr.,
“NOTA would hardly cure all o f contemporary democracy's problems, but it would
give voters a better altemative to the bad choices they often find in the polling
booth and change candidates' behavior for the better” (Pitney, 1994).^®

“ Wood. par. 9.
“ Hoover, par. 12.
^

Ibid., par. 13.

“ John J. Pitney. Jr., T h e Right to Vole fiar None of the Above: 'NOTA' Bcpands Ballot
Options.” par. 1 [Lkd. The Center for Voting and Democracy—The Right to Vote for None o f the
Above] (May 1994 [cited 2 July 1999]); availabie from Worid W ide Web @
htto:/Awww.fiairvote.oro/cvd reoorts/1995/cho6/bitnev.html
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF TURNOUT STATISTICS
Throughout this chapter we w ill be evaluating the connection between
dissatisfaction with Nevada’s electoral system and low voter turnout Nevada is
only one case study, but it provides the best indicators fo r evaluating people's
reactions to a binding “none o f these candidates” law because it is the only state
that currently employs a non-binding form o f NOTA. This chapter w ill focus on
aspects o f a binding “none of these candidates” law that offer encouragement fo r
citizens who are reluctant to vote in Nevada’s elections. Not only w ill a binding
“none o f these candidates” law make our society more democratic, but it will also
open the lines o f communication between citizens and legislators so that other
problems may be resolved in the process.
Even though Nevada’s version o f NOTA does not take advantage o f the
fu ll impact that “none o f these candidates” can have on democracy, it is receiving
increasing attention as a symbol fo r democratic voting in the United States. More
than twenty-five states employ some variation o f NOTA in at least one political
race, but Nevada is the only state to mandate the appearance o f “none o f these
candidates” below the lis t o f candidate names in every statewide political race.
NOTA is the equivalent o f a “no confidence” vote in a parliam entary system, but it
is exercised by the people rather than by the legislature (Nader, “None o f the
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Above, 1999)/ The opportunity for voters to withhold their consent from a
particular list o f candidates makes NOTA democratic.

Democracy
Political theorists have traditionally defined democracy as the people
ruling themselves. In order to rule themselves effectively in a representative
democracy, citizens must consent to being governed and they must be given a
meaningful choice as to who w ill represent them. The existing electoral system
fails on both counts. In our system, citizens consent to allowing representatives
to make decisions for them by voting in elections, but there is no conventional
mechanism in place for withholding consent from a set o f candidates for public
office. When candidates run for office without opposition, citizens are forced
without consent to having these officials make decisions fo r them, even if a
m ajority o f voters would have voted against the candidate. In this case, they are
not free to rule themselves because they are not making the ultimate decision
regarding who w ill represent them and how they w ill be ruled. In cases where
citizens are forced to choose between two unacceptable candidates, voters are
robbed o f the opportunity to withhold their consent from that slate o f candidates.
Voters in this situation must consent to the lesser o f two evils because they are
given no recourse other than leaving the ballot blank. W hile our system provides
us with a conventional method fo r consenting, it offers no conventional method

' Ralph Nader, “None of the Above: Proper, Long Overdue,’ In Policy Insights, par. 3
[online Journal] [cited 27 April 1999]; available from World W ide Web @
htto://www:nader96.oiq/nota1.htm
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for withholding consent from a particular lis t o f candidates. A protest vote in the
form o f a binding “none o f these candidates” law would offer citizens the option of
withholding their consent without compelling citizens to challenge the
govemment through unconventional protests. In order to express consent, the
people must have the option o f withholding their consent as well. An act is not
consensual if you are forced into it. According to political scientist John J. Pitney,
NOTA would secure the right to say no. If free govemment is really
based on the consent of the govemed, it follows that people should
have a clear way of withholding consent from the unworthy, the
unknown, or the unopposed (The Right to Vote fo r None o f the
Above, 1994).^
Non-voting is not an effective option for withholding consent because non-voting
has traditionally been considered a silent expression of consent
Potential voters may feel that there is no use voting because there is not a
meaningful difference between the candidates of the two ruling parties. The
more potential voters protest by staying home on Election Day, the more elected
officials feel that they can dismiss the wishes o f their constituents and
concentrate on pleasing interest groups and elites. According to Steve Lilienthal:
American voters are supposed to have choices between—at the
very least—two candidates offering contrasting philosophies.
However, all too often, their choices are severely circumscribed
because today’s political campaigns have become contests, not of
ideas, but o f poll ratings and fundraising prowess (1998).®

* John J. Pitney, Jr., T h e Rightto Vote for None of the Above; 'NOTA’ Expands Ballot
Options,” par.1 [Lkd. The Center for Voting and Democracy—The Right to vote for None of the
Above] (M ay 1994 [cited 2 July 1999]); available from World Wide Web @
http://Www.Mrvote.ora/bvd reoorts/l995/ichD6/bltnev.htmt
^ Steve Lilienthal. "NOTA’ Movement Working to Place 'None o f the Above’ Option on
Ballots,” par. 1 [Lkd. LPC Monthly February 1998—*NOTA* Movement] (February 1998 [cited 2
July 1999]); available from World Wide Web @ http://Www.ca.lp.ora/lDcm/9802-NOTAhtmt
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NOTA allows third party voters to clump their votes together in a manner that
ensures that their votes w ill be counted and reported in the Secretary o f State’s
official election results. This gives voters the opportunity to bring public attention
to their lack o f confidence in the candidates listed on the ballot Binding “none of
these candidates” option would allow voters to show their disapproval fo r the
candidates listed on the baliot without abstaining from participation in the
electoral process or wasting their vote on an option that cannot win the election.

Turnout Statistics
The widening gap between citizens eligible to vote and actual voters
indicates that citizens are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their electoral
choices. According to Winders, “less than 70% o f the voting-age population in
the U.S. is registered to vote” and tumout among our nation’s youth ranks twenty
percent below the national average (1999).^ If this dissatisfaction cannot be
cured, “none of these candidates” may be able to m itigate some o f the problems
by offering citizens an institutional outlet fo r their dissatisfaction. Citizens should
not be forced to resort to unconventional protest when an effective ballot
measure is all that is needed fo r them to express their dissatisfaction. A binding
“none o f these candidates” option allows citizens to constructively express their
criticism against candidates on tire ballot without abstaining from the electoral
process altogether.

* Bill Winders, T h e Roller Coaster of Class Conflict: Class Segments, Mass Mobilization
and Voter Tumout in the U.S., 1840-1996.” Social Forces. March 1999, vol. 77, no. 3,839.
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Figure 1. Registration and Tumout
Percentages in Nevada
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Figure

illustrates the pattern for registration and voting in Nevada. The

data fo r Figure 1 was obtained by dividing the number o f people who are old

^ Federal Election Commission. Voter Reoatration and Tumout—1996. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1996. ONLINE. [22 July 1999]; available from World Wide Web @
httD://vvww.fec.QOv/Daaes/96to.htm
Heller, Dean, Ed. The Political Htetorv of Nevada 1996. Carson City; Nevada, 1997,
302-329.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 732,
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: September 1978," U.S. Govemment
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 879,
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: March 1980," U.S. Govemment
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 1980.
U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 916,
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: July 1982," U S. Govemment Printing
Offk», Washington, D.C., 1982.
U.S. Bureau o f the Census. Current Poouiatidn Reports. Series P-25, No. 947,
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: November 1984," U.S. Govemment
Printing Office, Washington, D C ., 1984.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Pooutatibn Reports. Series P-25, No. 1019,
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States: January 1988," U.S. Govemment
Printing Office. Washington, D C ., 1988.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Poouiatidn Reports. Series P-25, No. 1059,
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age fbr the States: April 1990," U.S. Govemment Printing
Office, Washington. D C .. 1990.
U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Current Population Reports. Series P-25, No. 1085,
‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age fbr the States: April 1992." U.S. Govemment Printing
Office. Washington, D C .. 1992.
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enough to vote in Nevada by the number o f registered voters and by the number
o f people who voted fo r each presidential election year surveyed.^ The
percentage of registered voters reached its lowest point in the survey during the
1980 presidential election when only 49.6% o f Nevada’s voting age population
was registered to vote. Between 1980 and 1992 the percentage o f registered
voters and the percentage o f people who voted gradually increased by 15% and
9% respectively, but since the 1992 election, tum out has decreased and
registration rates have remained the same. The lowest level o f voter tumout
during the years surveyed occurred in 1996 when only 38.3% of Nevada's
eligible voters showed up at the polls.
By June 1999,150,618 voters were registered as non-partisans or third
party supporters. The rest o f Nevada’s 893,061 registered voters were almost
evenly split between the Republican Party (371,499) and the Democratic Party
(370,944).^ Only 64% o f Nevada’s voting age population is currently registered
to vote and only 38% o f the voting age population tumed out to vote in the 1996
Presidential Election. According to the Federal Election Commission, Nevada’s
registration rates rank 10% below the national average and tum out ranks 11%

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports. Serfes P-25. No. 1132,
‘‘Projections of the Population of Voting Age for the States; April 1998," U.S. Govemment Printing
Office, Washington, D C .. 1998.
^ The number of people counted to ascertain the voting age population is slightly Inflated
because a small percentage of adults are not eligible to vote due to their status as a citizen of
another country, convicted felon or mentally incompetent person as determined by a court of law.
^ Nevada’s County Clerks and Registrars ofVoters. "Statewide Voter Registration
Figures fbr the End of June 1999 by County and Party." ONLINE. (June 1999 [cited 22 July
1999]); Secretary of State available @ http://sos.nv.us/rivetection/voter rea/0699main.htm
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below the national average.® This information is even more alarming when we
note that Nevada’s population is growing faster than any other westem state, but
tum out rates have not increased as quickly in comparison.® In the ten-year
interval between 1980 and 1990, Nevada’s voting age population increased by
50% while the percentage o f voters among the voting age population Increased
by only 27%. During the eight years between 1990 and 1998 Nevada’s
population increased again by 45% while the percentage of voters among the
voting age population increased by a mere 37%.^® According to the data
presented in Figure 1, roughly ten percent of the registered public failed to
exercise their right to vote In each Presidential election year surveyed. W hile the
percentage o f citizens registered to vote in Nevada remained constant between
the 1992 and 1996 election cycles, more than one-fourth of the registered public
abstained from voting in 1996. This suggests that despite Nevada’s tremendous
population growth between the 1992 and 1996 election cycles, the number of
people who register to vote in Nevada is relatively stable and the number o f

®Federal Election Commission. Voter Registration and Turnout— 1996. Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1996. ONLINE. [22 July 1999]; available from World Wide Web @
httD://Www.fec.QOv/baQes/96to.htm
^ Narroll, Maud and Sandra Allen. Budget and Planning Department “Nevada Statistical
Abstract" A special report prepared in cooperation with the Nevada Department of
Administration. ONLINE. [22 July 1999]; Governor available at
htto://www.state.nv.us/budQet/saDOD.htm
Nevada Secretary of State. "1998 Official Election Results." ONLINE. (December
1998 [cited 22 July 1999]); Secretary of State available: httDVfeos.state.nv.us/nvelection/
U.S. Department of Commerce. Number of Inhabitants. Bureau of the Census. U.S.
Govemment Printing Office. Washington D C ., 1980.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Number of inhabitants. Bureau of the Census. U.S.
Govemment Printing Office. Washington D C ., 1990.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Number of inhabitants. Bureau of the Census.
Washington D.C., (1998 [cited 5 March 1999]}; available from Worid Wide Web @
httD:/Awww.census.aov/DODulation/estimatesfetate/st-98-1.txt
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people who actually vote is declining. Many believe that dissatisfaction with
govemment is the reason behind this decline. According to Rock the Vote
President Mark Strama, “public frustration with govemment has been the most
powerful force in American politics in the 1990’s” (75).^'' Low voter tum out is one
consequence o f that frustration.
W hile the current “none o f these candidates” law has provided an
ineffective solution fo r the growing tum out problem, a binding “none of these
candidates” law offers some hope o f inspiring registered voters to show up at the
polls on Election Day. The temporary increase in voter tum out seen in 1992 may
suggest that a growing number o f Nevadans who would not go to the polls in
order to vote fo r a lesser o f two evils, w ill go if given another choice. Many non
partisans and third party voters went to the polls on Election Day in 1992 so that
they could vote fo r Ross Perot because the Perot candidacy appealed to people
who are alienated by the politics o f the two m ajor parties. According to Rock the
Vote President Mark Strama:
The movement away from party allegiance is especially
pronounced among young people. . . Rock the Vote registers more
Independents than Republicans and Democrats com bined. . .
Young people te ll us all the tim e that no one in the political system
seems to be talking to them. (1998)^^
The Perot candidacy provided a viable altem ative to the politics o f the two major
parties in 1992, but that meaningful altem ative deteriorated w ith Perots last

Mark Strama. "Overcoming Cynkasm: Youth Participation and Becforat Politics."
Nationat Civic Review. Spring 1998, vol. 87. no. 1,7 5 .
"Ibid., 77-78.
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minute candidacy in 1996. As Figure 2^® suggests, third party votes among
Nevada's statewide political contests increased from 9,878 in 1988 to a recordbreaking 168,975 in 1992.^"^ At the same time, “none of these candidates” votes
remained relatively stable. This suggests that the increase in 1992 tumout
shown in Figure 1 and the increase in 1992 third party votes can be explained by
the attraction o f disenchanted voters to the perceived viability o f Perot’s third
party candidacy. By waiting until the last minute to announce his candidacy in
1996, Ross Perot ^ ile d to inspire all o f his 1992 supporters to vote on Election
Day. If Perofs supporters knew that he was running for the presidency in 1996,
they may have fe lt that he did not have a reasonable chance o f winning because
Perot support decreased from 26% o f Nevada voters in 1992 to 9% o f Nevada
voters in the 1996 presidential election. Tumout decreased by 12% and third
party votes decreased by 113,522 votes the same year because non-partisans
and third party supporters who voted for Perot in 1992 decided to stay home on
Election Day in 1996. This data tells us that there is support for altem ative
candidates among potential voters, but those voters w ill not show up on Election
Day unless they perceive a reasonable chance o f changing the election results.
A binding “none o f these candidates” law offers hope for these disenchanted
voters by allowing them to voice their disapproval against candidates who do not
adequately address their needs, offering them a consistent altem ative to the two

13

Heller, 313-329.

The data for Figure 2 was calculated by adding all third party votes fbr statewide offices
recorded In Nevada for each year surveyed. These totals do not reflect solety the number of
people who voted for Perot In the 1992 election.
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major parties and giving them a reason to show up at their polling place on
Election Day.
More than 70% of the nation’s eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds abstained
from voting in the 1996 election.^® The irony in that statistic is that more people
in this age group are participating in community activities through volunteer work
than ever before. In 1997 UCLA conducted a nationwide survey o f college
freshmen. The survey found that college freshmen were more likely to spend
time doing volunteer work in 1997 than they were in 1967, but they also found
that college freshmen in 1997 were less concerned about politics than any other
class over the last thirty years.^® The study indicated that these young people
could not see any connection between their volunteer work and politics.^^ The
young people in the study did not want to be associated with politics and they
lacked any view o f how they had contributed to society beyond the immediate
gratification for themselves and those they were helping. The study concluded
that their actions are a result o f an unprecedented decline in trust for govemment
that is correlated with the decline in electoral participation. Allowing voters to
publicly voice their distrust through “none o f the above” may be a step towards
bringing potential voters back in to electoral politics by creating a dialogue
between citizens and politicians about how to solve problems with the political
system.

15

Strama, 71.

"Ib id .
"Ib id .
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A survey conducted by Rock the Vote found that only 27% o f adults
between the ages o f seventeen and twenty-nine believed that the 1996
presidential candidates were honest or truthful (1998)/® According to Strama.
young people are “skeptical o f political parties, frustrated with the political
process, and distrustful o f politicians” (1998)/® We can only hope that a binding
“none o f these candidates” law can motivate those who are distrustful of
candidates on the ballot to come to the polls and voice their distrust publicly. A
significant “none o f the above” vote may motivate the two major parties to realign
themselves so that the needs of disengaged voters are addressed in the political
system. If voter outrage, due to the lack o f an honest candidate, is a factor in the
declining tumout rate, “none of the above” offers some hope o f fixing the problem
by threatening the candidacy o f any politician who voters deem unworthy o f
political office.
Declining partisanship appears to be a strong motivating factor in declining
participation. As the public has become less partisan in nature, politicians have
moved toward the center o f the ideological spectrum in order to attract voters.
This middle o f the road phenomenon is correlated with the downward spiral in
citizen participation rates. Since both parties are walking the center line on
political issues, partisan disagreements have focused on programmatic
differences rather than general ideological différences. These “programmatic
differences” usually revolve around how much funding should be given to specific

" Ibid.
" Ib id .
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policies and how specific portions o f a b ill should be tailored rather than focusing
on ideological disagreements. Such dry issues do not attract the attention o f the
mass public because they focus on technical specialization rather than on a core
ideological assumption that can be applied to various policies. W hile this trend
makes our politics more homogeneous, it also makes the choice between two
candidates (holding subtle variations o f the same viewpoint) less significant If
there is no real difference between candidates, why bother voting? A binding
“none o f these candidates” law would give citizens who stray from the center of
the ideological spectrum an opportunity to voice their disapproval of various
policies without discouraging citizens from voting. Not only do candidates have
to listen to the arguments o f the opposing party in a binding “none o f the above”
system, but they also have to listen to the arguments o f a disenchanted non
partisan coalition with the option to choose “none o f the above.”
Figure 2^® is a summary o f the average vote fo r “none o f these
candidates” among all statewide general election races and the highest vote for
“none o f these candidates” in any one general election race between 1976 and
1996. W hile the average “none o f these candidates” vote averaged across all of
the election years studied is only 8%, the figure illustrates that “none o f these
candidates” w ill usually earn approximately 20% o f the vote in at least one
statewide race. Thus, one in five voters w ill be dissatisfied with every candidate
listed on the ballot in a t least one statewide general election race. The average
and highest NOTA votes fo r the presidential election years surveyed (8.5% and
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17.7%, respectively) are roughly equal to the average and highest NOTA votes
experienced in the off-year elections sun/eyed (8.2% and 18.2%, respectively).
Thus, we may conclude that state supreme court races stabilize the number o f
NOTA votes so that the difference between presidential election years and offyear elections is no longer noticeable.

Figure 2. General Election NOTA
Votes in Nevada
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Even though Nevada's current "none o f these candiates” law cannot
change election outcomes, voters often choose to invoke the "none o f these
candidates” option in statewide primary races. Figure 3^^ shows the average
vote fo r "none o f these candidates” in every statewide primary race from 1976
through 1996, the average "none o f these candidates” vote in each statewide

^ Ibid.. 313-329. The AVG column represents the average of the totals from all of the
years surveyed in each category.
Ibid.. 345-353.
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party primary, and the highest “none o f these candidates" vote in each election
year sunreyed. The year 1984 was omitted from the table because there were
no statewide primary races In that year. The 1996 average “none o f these
candidates” vote for the democratic party primary was also omitted because the
democrats did not hold any statewide primaries that year. The 9% figure for the
other three categories in 1996 result from only one statewide republican primary
held in that year. The average “none o f these candidates" vote among
Democrats (12%) and Republicans (16%) in their party primaries are relatively
sim ilar. NOTA does not appear to benefit one party over the other. This explains
why “none o f these candidates" is considered a non-partisan reform with
advocates on both sides of the political spectrum. The intense frequency of
“none o f these candidates” votes tabulated in primary elections suggests that
voters are attempting to send their political parties a message to recruit stronger
candidates or risk party members defecting and voting for another party's
candidate. This message is currently ineffective because parties know that
“none o f the above” votes w ill not cost them the election. A binding NOTA
system would force political parties to recruit stronger candidates to run in the
primary election or risk having to recruit a second batch o f candidates fo r the
special election.
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Figure 3. Primary Election NOTA Votes
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Figure 4. General Election Tumout Drop-off
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Figure 5. Primary Election Tumout Drop-off
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The level o f tum out drop-off depicted in Figure 4 ^ and Figure 5^ indicates
heightening dissatisfaction among citizens who regularly vote. Drop-off is
characterized by a tendency to vote for some offices on the ballot, but reject
voting fo r others. These citizens go to the polls and vote fo r the candidates at
the top o f the ticket, but they refuse to vote for state Supreme Court justices and
local officials at the bottom of the ticke t Levels o f tum out drop-off are significant
to the study o f the “none o f these candidates" law because NOTA opponents
believe that tumout drop-off currently demonstrates lack o f confidence in the
candidates on the ballot without humiliating any elected officials running for
office. Upon original consideration o f Nevada's “none o f these candidates” law,
the Clark County Registrar o f Voters, Stanton Colton, told the assembly “the total
number o f votes cast fo r all candidates, subtracted from the total number o f
people who voted in that precinct, provides you with an expression of noconfidence.” According to Colton, this eliminates the need fo r a “none o f these
candidates” law to make the information public (Colton, 1975).^'*
When the Nevada assembly originally debated the merits of M ello's “none
o f these candidates” law, opponents focused on tum out drop-off as one reason
for rejecting the landmark legislation. These speakers claimed that drop-off is

^ Ibid., 345-353. For the purposes ofthis study, partisan races include Presidents VicePresident, Senator, U.S. Representatwe, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State.
Treasurer, Controller and Attorney General.
^ Ibid., 313-329. In order to account for blank cells, the reader should note that there
was no Democratic Primary in 1988 or 1992 and there was no Republican Primary in 1996.
Neither par^ held a statewide primary in 1984.
Stanton B. Cotton to Assemblyman Daniel Demers, 7 March 1975, Election Committee
Minutes—March 18.1975. (Carson City, 1975), 1-2.
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indicative o f the number o f voters who lack confidence in the candidates on the
ballot, therefore making a line on the ballot reading “none o f the above”
redundant and unnecessary. The problem is that tum out drop-off is still focusing
on non-voting as a method for voters to withhold consent from a list of
candidates. If drop-off is synonymous with lack o f confidence for the candidates
listed on the ballot, calculations o f tum out drop-off should be looked at in
conjunction with the number o f registered voters who stayed home on Election
Day. W hile NOTA opponents may view tum out drop o ff as an expression of a
lack o f confidence, other officials attribute tumout drop-off to less menacing
factors like ballot M g u e or lack o f party cues.^ One way to determine how
much tum out drop-off is indicative o f a lack o f confidence fo r candidates on the
ballot is to enact binding “none o f the above” legislation.
Figure 4 demonstrates that while 97% of those who vote usually vote in
every partisan race, 13% o f those who vote w ill usually refuse to cast their ballot
for at least one supreme court justice or local official in the general election. This
is significant because the costs to the voter fo r checking a few extra boxes are
minimal. Most supreme court races are either uncontested or non-competitive
due to the lack o f knowledge o f the candidates listed on the ballot^^ W hile
tumout drop-off may sometimes indicate a lack o f confidence with candidates on
the ballot, elected officials w ill not take it seriously when it does not have the
“ Nevada Assembly, Election Committee, Election Committee Minutes—March 18.1975.
(Carson City, 1975), 1-2.
Nevada Assembly, Election Committee. Election Committee Minutes—March 25.1975.
(Carson City, 1975), 2.
26

Heller, 313-329.
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power to affect their re-election prospects. A binding 'none of these candidates”
law would allow voters to send candidates a clear signal conveying their lack of
trust for candidates on the ballot.
Tumout drop-off rates increase significantly in primary elections where
nearly one-third of those voting abstain from casting ballots in at least one
primary race. Without significant tum out drop-off from party members, there
would be more votes fo r supreme court justices and local officials than fo r
partisan offices. In the state primary, non-partisans receive a ballot that does not
include any partisan races, but partisans vote for both partisan and non-partisan
offices. In a hypothetical primary we can assume that 400,000 Republican
ballots are sent out, 400,000 Democratic primary ballots are sent out and
200,000 non-partisan prim ary ballots are sent out. We w ill also assume that half
o f the people in each category vote in the primary election and people who vote
cast ballots do so for every office on the ticket. The results would be 500,000
votes for non-partisan offices and 200,000 votes for each party’s candidates in
the primary election. Even if we combine the votes fo r partisan offices, nonpartisan votes exceed partisan votes by 100,000 votes. If there were 0 ballots
returned from non-partisans and all o f the partisans voted for every office on the
ballot, there would still be 400,000 votes in non-partisan races and 400,000 votes
in partisan races. Thus, without high tum out drop-off and low non-partisan
tum out in primary elections, non-partisan votes would always outnumber partisan
votes in the primary election. Since partisans vote fb r members o f their own
party as w ell as non-partisan offices In the state primary, one would expect that
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the combination of partisan and non-partisan votes would be significantly higher
than votes fo r partisan offices from either o f the two major parties. Ironically,
despite the increasing number of non-partisan voters casting ballots in Nevada's
primary elections, partisan offices get more votes than non-partisan offices due
to tum out drop-off and low tumout among non-partisans In primary elections.
Allowing voters to choose the “none of these candidates” option in local races
would lead to less tum out drop-off by weeding out candidates that voters have
deemed unworthy o f political office. Significant victories for NOTA in primary
elections would send party leaders a message to recruit a stronger slate o f
candidates in the next election.
A review o f Nevada’s low voter tumout, the high percentages o f non
binding NOTA votes in Nevada’s electoral system and the dramatic drop-off rate
among voters suggest that voters are dissatisfied with elected officials in Nevada.
The average NOTA vote from 1976 to 1996 is 8%. Extremely low NOTA votes in
presidential races depress the NOTA average over all elections because the
presidential race normally attracts extraordinarily qualified candidates for public
office. Races for supreme court justice reflect the opposite extreme. The
average NOTA vote among races fo r a seat as a justice on the Nevada Supreme
Court is 17%. The lowest NOTA vote that was received in any supreme court
justice race was 5%. Seventeen percent o f voters w ill cast their ballot fo r
president and vice president without voting fo r Nevada supreme court justices in
the average presidential election year, while 12% o f citizens w ill cast their ballot
for governor o r senator in the average off-year election without voting fo r any
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supreme court justices. Nevada supreme court justices, like other less known
politicians, often run unopposed. The binding version o f “none of these
candidates” would offer voters an automatic altemative to these unopposed
candidates. According to Dr. Pitney, “with NOTA, even unopposed candidates
could lose if the voters deemed them unworthy” (1994).^ “The prospect of such
a defeat might discourage bottom-feeders from seeking office, and would give
party leaders an incentive to consider m erit when making endorsements,” quips
Pitney (1994).“
Often, citizens are given no choice regarding their elected officials
because there is only one candidate running for office. Figure 6“ illustrates the
frequency o f races where only one candidate is running fo r political office in
Nevada. In cases where elections are uncontested, we simply award the
election to a person who filled out the application to have their name placed on
the b a llo t Citizens are s till asked to come to the polls and vote in uncontested
general election races, but we do not give these citizens any option for voting
against uncontested officials. The “none o f these candidates” option offers
voters a way to withdraw their consent from a candidate when he or she is the
only person on the b a llo t Nevada law does not permit the appearance of
uncontested races on prim ary ballots; hence, there is no institutional outlet for
withholding consent from candidates in uncontested prim aries. Unlike other

^ Ib id .
“ Ibid.
“ Heller. 313-329; 330-353.
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States, Nevada (aw also prohibits writing in a candidate that voters prefer over
those candidates listed on the ballot The “none o f these candidates” option
provides disapproving citizens with their only opportunity to have their complaints
against unopposed candidates documented in the official election results. The
“none o f the above” option makes voting more democratic because it offers
citizens an altemative to voting for unopposed candidates.

Figure 6. Uncontested Races
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Uncontested races present a very real problem In Nevada’s electoral
system. The lack o f an opponent deprives voters o f their right to choose who w ill
represent them because they are forced to consent to the only candidate on the
ballot or abstain from voting altogether. If voters are not given an effective
choice as to which candidates they can elect, the process is not democratic.
Figure 8 indicates that between 1976 and 1996,37% o f all general election races
were uncontested in Nevada. Eleven percent o f Nevada's statewide offices were
uncontested in the same time fram e. The statistics for primary races are even
more alarming. On average, 67% o f all primary races and 44% o f statewide
primaries offer voters only one candidate to choose from. Figure 7 shows that
about half o f all offices were uncontested in five o f the eleven general election
years surveyed— 1976,1978,1984,1990 and 1996^°. When opposing
candidates are absent from half o f the offices on the ballot, we begin to question
how so-called “elected officials” are chosen for office. In uncontested races,
candidates who file paperwork to run for office are automatically selected to fill
the position. This procedure could have a devastating effect on the quality of
elected officials. Local races are 26% more likely than statewide races to be
uncontested on average, but statewide elected offices are the only offices that
give voters the “none o f these candidates” option in Nevada—even when races
fo r local offices have no opposing candidates. Democracy thrives on the citizens’

^ Ibid., 313-329,345-354. For the purposes of this study. Presidents Vice President,
U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State
Treasurer. State Controller, Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Seats A through E are
considered statewide or national offices. The title national office was added because the office of
US Representative in Congress was not considered a statewide office after the state gained a
second seat in the House of Representatives in 1982.
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fo r local offices have no opposing candidates. Democracy thrives on the citizens’
ability to make a choice about the way they want to be governed and who w ill
represent his interests best Nevada’s current system does not offer
disenchanted voters a meaningful choice when there is only one candidate listed
on the ballot, you can vote fo r that candidate or not vote at all. The binding
version of “none o f these candidates” would offer voters an automatic alternative
to unopposed candidates.
Dissatisfied citizens are not given any real choice when it comes to
representation. The lack o f a clear alternative to the candidates listed on the
ballot illustrates a weakness in our electoral system. When a citizen does not
approve of any o f the candidates listed on the ballot, his choices are limited to
choosing the lesser o f two evils or not voting at all. Since non-voting does not
prevent unworthy candidates from taking office, it is not a viable method o f
consenting to or withdrawing your consent from a particular slate of government
officials. Citizens are not given a democratic choice when they are deprived o f
the ability to withhold their consent from a lis t o f candidates fo r public office.
Consent should be a positive demonstration o f approval fo r a candidate instead
o f a choice between lesser evils. Amending ballots so that “none of these
candidates” appears beneath the list o f candidate names fo r every office would
give voters the option o f form ally withholding their consent from all o f the
candidates on the b a llo t This gives disenchanted voters a reason to come to the
polls on Election Day and it puts elected officials more in touch with the needs
and desires o f th e ir constituents. At the same time, “none o f these candidates”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42
would offer the electorate a chance to demonstrate their approval for a new slate
o f candidates instead of lim iting voters to a choice between two evils.
The option to choose NOTA would increase citizens' feelings o f political
efficacy. Frequent occurences of uncontested races can decrease citizens’
feelings o f political efficacy by consistently robbing them o f their opportunity to
elect public officials. In a binding NOTA system, special elections would exist as
proof that citizens’ voices have been heard and candidates would be accountable
to their constituents. Voters would no longer have to decide on the lesser o f two
evils. If voters do not like the candidates, they can cast their ballots for NOTA.
“None of these candidates” provides an institutional outlet fo r expressing
dissatisfaction with politicians. Citizens would no longer have to demonstrate
their dissatisfaction by abstaining on Election Day. A mobilized electorate is vital
to the concept o f democracy. The people must express their wishes in order to
rule themselves democratically. If NOTA can reform our current system of
choosing between lesser evils to provide a choice between responsive policy
makers, the benefits would be priceless.
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CHAPTER 3

THE INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE
Once a candidate is elected to office, the system Is tailored to discourage
citizens from withdrawing their consent from that elected official. Incumbent
congressmen are given a variety of resources for communicating with their
constituents including free postage for official business, free use of studios to
produce radio and television footage, internet service, and free long distance
telephone service (Jacobson, 1997).^ Congressmen also have a generous
budget to pay fo r their office space, personal staff and travel to and from the
district (Jacobson, 1997).^ Challengers m ust pay for such luxuries either from
their own pockets or through fundraising efforts.
The retention rate o f incumbent congressmen demonstrates that a second
candidate on the ballot does not always induce enough competition to give voters
a real choice. Common Cause, a watchdog group created to keep citizens
informed about elected officials, calculates that on average 90% o f House
congressional elections are not competitive, “meaning that either there is no
major party opponent to the incumbent or tha t the opponent is grossly under-

' Gary C. Jacobson. The Politics of Congressional Elections (New York: Addison Wesley
Educational Publishers, 1997). 29.
^Ibid.
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financed" (Nader, None o f the Above: Proper, Long, Overdue, 1999).^ One study
of the 1988 campaign season concluded that an incumbent congressman’s odds
o f dying during his term in office were actually higher that his odds o f losing a
reelection attempt due to the 98% incumbent retention rate In that election
(Hoover, 1993).^ There was a 93% incumbent retention rate in the U.S.
Congress in 1992 despite public outrage over the House bank scandal,
controversy surrounding congressmen voting for financial incentives to retire
early and redistricting following the 1990 census (Hoover, 1993).® Former
California Secretary o f State Tony M iller contends that, “the inability to raise huge
sums o f money to match incumbent war chest funds sometimes drives potentially
excellent candidates from the arena altogether” (1994).® “Eighteen house races
in eleven states topped one million dollars” in 1990, according to one study
(M iller, 1994).^ Few challengers can muster the finances and support to throw an
incumbent out o f office. Voters may be given a choice between an unworthy
incumbent and an unknown challenger who lacks the financial resources to win

®Ralph Nader, “None o f the Above: Proper, Long Overdue,” in Policy Insights, par. 8.
[online journal] [cited 27 April 1999]; available from World Wide Web @
httD://www.nader96.ora/nota1 .htm
* Gary Hoover. “None o f the Above—The People's Veto,” in Policy Insights, par. 5 [online
Journal] vol. 521 (December 1993 [cited 10 February 1999D; available from World Wide Web @
http://Www.nota.ora/bi521 .htm
®lbid.
®Tony Miller. "The Case for None of the Above,” in Policy Insights, par. 3 [online Joumai]
vol. 615 (September 1994 [citect 10 March 1999]); available from World Wide Web @
httDr//Www.nota.ora/bi61Shtml
^ Ibid.. par. 4.
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the election (Pitney, The Right to Vote No, 1994).® Since media moguls and
campaign patrons often ignore minor party candidates, they have “little hope o f
competing in any real way to provide voters with a clear alternative to their better
known, vastly better-funded opponents" (M iller, 1994).® Faced with
Insurmountable odds, qualified challengers are often driven away from public
office. “None of the above" ensures that there is always a recognizable
candidate to challenge entrenched incumbents; that candidate is “none o f the
above.”

Figure 7. General Election Races
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®John J. Pitney, Jr.. T h e Right to Vote No: NOTA Ballot Options,” In Policv Insights, par.
2 [online Journal] vol. 606 (May 1994 [cited 10 February 1999]); available from World Wide Web
<a htto://Www.nota.ora/bi608.htmt
' Miller, par. 3.
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While these statistics reflect incumbency trends across the United States,
an inquiry into Nevada elections provides sim ilar results. In the average election
year, nearly half o f the offices on the Nevada ballot feature an incumbent running
for re-election.^° To make matters worse, the incumbent faces only a 15%
chance that he w ill lose his re-election bid. “None of these candidates”
challenges incumbents to prove that they are worthy of re-election when they are
not facing competition from other candidates on the ba llo t Competition among
political candidates allows voters to choose the most worthy candidate instead of
settling on an incumbent who does not adequately represent their interests.
Figure 7^^ represents the likelihood that an incumbent w ill be running for
any given seat during the election years surveyed. Calculations for Figure 7 are
obtained by dividing the total number o f races by the number o f incumbents
running for re-election thatyear.^^ The figure suggests that more incumbents run
fo r office during presidential election years, regardless o f whether you are looking
at local, state or national races in Nevada. According to Figure 7, an average of
49% o f the races on the ballot between 1976 and 1996 feature incumbents. The
average increases to 56% If you look exclusively at the presidential election
years surveyed and drops to 41% if you look only at off-year elections. The
percentage o f races involving incumbents increased steadily during presidential
The calculation that Incumbents are running for 49% of the offices on the ballot in the
average election year between 1976 and 1996 is based on data revealed in Figure 7.
" Heller, Dean, Ed. The Political Histonr of Nevada 1996. Carson City: Nevada, 1997,
313-329.
For the purposes of Figure 7 and Rgure 8, local offices refer only to those offices listed
in Secretary of State Dean Heller's Political History of Nevada 1996. These offices include two
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election years through 1984 and then decreased from 72% in 1980 to 44% in
1984. Since the incumbency rate during a presidential election year reached its
low o f 44% in 1984, it has increased gradually in each subsequent election,
falling at 67% in 1996. The trend toward incumbents campaigning in off-year
elections increased gradually from its low o f 18% in 1982 to its high of 67% in
1990, but the number decreased to 43% in the 1994 election cycle. The
percentage o f offices that feature incumbents between 1976 and 1996 range
from a low o f 18% in 1982 to a high o f 72% in 1984.
A t the state and national level. Figure 7 reveals that an average o f 66% of
the races on Nevada's ballots involved incumbents running fo r re-election during
the years surveyed. The average number o f incumbents running for state and
national offices increases to 77% during presidential election years, but that
figure is ofteet by incumbents campaigning fo r only 53% o f the races in off-year
elections. W hile the number o f incumbents campaigning for state and national
offices during presidential election years has increased sharply in 1984 to 100%
and 1992 to 83%, these increases have been followed by decreases to the level
o f 60% in 1980,1988 and 1996. The trend fo r state and national incumbents
during off-year elections has increased from 36% in 1982 to 70% in 1994. The
lowest number o f incumbents campaigning fo r state and national offices in
Nevada occurred in 1982 when incumbents were featured in only 36% o f the
races on the ballot. The highest percentage occurred in 1976 and 1984 when

seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, eleven members of the Board of Regents, eleven
members of the State Board of Education, and ferty-one districtjudges.
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every state and national office in Nevada featured an incumbent running fo r reelection.
A t the local level, an average o f 41% of the races on the ballot featured an
incumbent running for re-election. The average increased to 48% when
presidential election years were isolated from the other data and dropped to 33%
when only off-year elections were considered. The percentage of local races
featuring an incumbent during the presidential election years surveyed increased
from a low o f 20% during the 1976 election to a high of 69% during the 1984
election, but these increases were followed by a decrease to 36% in 1988 and a
recovery back to 68% in 1996. The number of local incumbents campaigning in
off-year elections increased from a low o f 6% in 1982 to a high of 68% in 1990,
then decreased sharply to 18% in 1994.
Despite the high percentages o f re-election attempts captured in Figure 7,
the numbers are lower than expected due to the creation o f new local offices
during alm ost every election year surveyed. The increase in local officials
reflects the growing number o f Nevada residents, but more offices do not ensure
more effective representation. Most o f the new local offices featured races that
were not competitive because there was only one candidate campaigning fo r the
new position. To make matters worse, the candidate who was campaigning for
the new local office was often unknown to the mass public.
“None o f these candidates” is useful during elections where there is either
no opposing candidate or no candidate that is known to voters on the b a llo t In
cases where candidates are running unopposed, “none o f the above” offers
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automatic opposition. Voting for an unknown politician is very risky considering
the amount o f responsibility that we entrust to public office holders. When the
candidates running for a particular office on the ballot are unknown to the voters,
“none o f these candidates” offers an incentive for candidates to make their name
known to the public. Encouraging voters to choose “none o f these candidates”
when they lack political knowledge of every candidate on the ballot is beneficial
to the electoral process because it shifts responsibility fo r providing information
about the issues of the campaign from the public back to the candidate.
Threatening candidates with “none of the above” votes gives the candidate an
incentive to address issues in the campaign and make his message readily
available to potential voters. Even candidates in uncontested races would have
to address issues in their campaign to avoid losing to “none o f the above” on
Election Day. “None o f these candidates” would ensure that citizens are given a
choice in these local races. With a binding “none o f these candidates” law there
is hope that elections could become more focused on issues that constituents
care about and less focused on thirty second soundbites that convey very little
information.
Figure 8^® portrays the percentage o f victorious incumbents in any given
election year from 1976 through 1996. W hile state and national candidates are
more likely to run for reelection according to Rgure 7, they are not more likely to
win their reelection attempt when compared to local officials in Rgure 8. The
odds o f an incumbent victory are good regardless o f the level o f govemment that
the candidate is campaigning to serve in. In 1976 and 1986 every incumbent
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running was reelected. According to the data presented in Figure 10, every
incumbent seeking statewide office was reelected in 1976,1978,1986,1990 and
1996. One hundred percent o f the local officials running in 1976,1982,1986,
1992 and 1994 also won re-election.

Figure 8. Percentage o f Incumbent Victories
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Calculations for Figure 8 were obtained by dividing the total number o f
incumbents on the ballot by the number o f candidates who won the election.
Figure 9 reflects the total number o f incumbents on the ballot, while Figure 10
reflects the number o f incumbents who were successful in winning their reelection campaigns. W hile Figure 7 shows tha t incumbents are more likely to run
fo r re-election during presidential election years. Figure 10 shows that
incumbents are more likely to win their re-election attempts during off-year

13

Ibid., 313-329.
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elections. Incumbents are 5% more likely to win at the state and national level
and 9% more likely to win at the local level during an off-year election. On
average, the incumbent has an 85% probability that he w ill be re-elected
regardless o f the level o f govemment that he is seeking office in. The
incumbency retention rate for state and nationai offices in Nevada is 82% during
a presidential election year and 87% during an off-year election. At the local
level, incumbents face an 86% incumbent retention rate during presidential
election years and a 95% retention rate during off-year elections. The data for all
of Nevada's elected offices ranges from 57% o f incumbents winning their reelection attempts in 1988 to 100% of incumbents winning re-election in 1976 and
1986.
“None o f the above” forces incumbents to run competitive, informative
elections that benefit all o f society. Voters who are dissatisfied with govemment
often view the current incumbent retention rate as evidence that their vote would
not be effective in removing that candidate from public office. “None o f these
candidates” gives these voters the opportunity to voice their dissatisfaction with
incumbents even if they cannot amass enough votes to have the incumbent
thrown out o f office. If a special election were held because an incumbent lost to
“none o f these candidates,” it could go a long way towards improving political
efficacy among the mass public and encouraging disenchanted voters to show
up at the polls.
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Money
The sources behind generous campaign contributions act to intensify the
dissatisfaction o f voters with incumbent officials. Increasing contributions from
special interests can lead to less consideration for constituent needs. Special
interests view campaign contributions as an investment. The group contributes
money to the candidate's campaign out o f the hope that the candidate, once in
office, will act as an advocate fo r the group by voting down legislation offensive
to the group and possibly sponsoring legislation in the group's interest. This
system of indirect quid pro quo acts as one causal effect in the degenerating
relationship between citizens and politicians. Candidates noble enough to resist
special interests w ill be so underfunded that they have no real chance o f winning
the election. A t the same time, candidates who sell out to the highest special
interest bidders are reelected to carry out favors for organized interests to the
detrim ent o f the people at large. According to a Common Cause study of the
1992 election, “349 incumbent members o f the House o f Representatives
received nearly ten times more contributions from political action committees
than their opponents" (M iller, 1994).^"^ W hile 24 of the 349 challengers were
successful in defeating the incumbent, “325 or 93% o f the incumbents were
returned to office, some owing more than half o f their success to special
interests” (M iller, 1994).^^ “As candidates rely more and more on major
contributors and PACs,” M iller contends, “voters feet more distanced from the

Miller, par. 5.
" Ibid.
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decision-making process" (1994).'*® The distance is caused by voters feeling that
“the big decisions have already been made by the big money interests before
candidates' names even appear on the ballot and that whoever is elected is so
behoiden to those interests that the voice o f ‘the little guy* w ill not be heard”
(1994)J^ NOTA advocates like Tony M iller are confident that “a victory fo r 'None
of the Above' would send a very strong message to officeholders, candidates and
campaigners th a t. . . if s tim e for a change, time to listen to the voters, not the
consuitants; time to consider the public interest, not their own political interests”
(1994).''®
Money is an easy target because the cost o f running a successful
campaign has skyrocketed. Statistics show that it costs alm ost half a m illion
dollars to run a successful campaign for a seat in the House o f Representatives.
Statistics also show that the candidate with the most money w ill win the election
most o f the time. Incumbents get more political contributions than do their
competitors; thus, the increase in the amount o f money available to incumbents
accounts fo r their high retention rates. According to Common Cause, only five
percent o f U.S. House races were “financially competitive” in 1990 (Hoover,
1993).^®

16

Ibid., par. 8.

" Ibid.
Ibid., par. 9.
Hoover, par. 4.
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It is not surprising that these statistics reflecting the im pact of money on
political campaigns would contribute to a decline in the feeling that a person’s
vote matters. The one man, one vote strategy handed down by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Canf®has been diluted by the ruling in Bucklev v. Valeo^^ that
political spending is the equivalent o f political speech. Money is actually more
effective than speech when it comes to influence over the politicai process.
According to Winders, money contributed to the decline in party mobilization
more than any other factor (1999).^ Political parties have focused on fundraising
rather than mobilization because it is a more efficient way o f winning an election.
Winders claims that PACs have “iimited policy options and outcomes by
increasing their influence over the two m ajor political parties" (1999).“ W inders
concludes that “political parties have become more reliant on money than on
organization, and mobilizing voters has become secondary (at best) to
fundraising" (1999).^^
A significant portion o f the money raised during a campaign is spent on
negative advertisements. Negative campaign advertisements rely on namecalling and mudslinging to get their messages across. The purpose of a
campaign advertisement is to manipulate a political issue into a one-sided sound

“ Bakery. Carr. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
21

Bucklev V. Vafeo. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

^ Bill Winders, T h e Roller Coaster of Class Conflict Class Segments, Mass
Mobilization, and Voter Turnout in the U.S., 1840-1996“ in Social Forces 77, no. 3 (March 1999):
852“ Ibid., 853-854.
” Ibid., 853.
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bite powerful enough to persuade voters in flavor o f the candidate sponsoring the
advertisement. A thirty-second sound bite w ill never tell you the whole story;
these sound bites often rely on a voter’s ignorance about what has not been said
to persuade them. Voters remember the advertisements when they go to the
polis, but the average voter is not given enough information in these commercials
to differentiate flactfrom fiction. The bitter irony is that campaign advertisements
are created to intentionally confuse voters by manipulating the facts and making
It appear that the other candidate has done something wrong. Campaign
consultants boast that the best campaign advertisements have a grain o f truth to
them, but they never mention the number o f lies that they extol. Politicians hope
that voters w ill believe the ir lies and vote based on them. They conduct polling to
figure out which lies are m ost believable and they continue to use these tactics in
every election year.
interest groups and PACs often use their contributions to pay for
advertisements attacking a candidate’s opponent even though surveys show that
negative advertisements demobilize the electorate. W ith NOTA in the picture,
candidates have an incentive not to show negative advertisements because
NOTA offers voters an alternative to voting fo r the candidates engaging in
mudslinging. The cost o f financing another candidate in the special election
coupled with a decline in the incumbency advantage would make monetary
campaign contributions less efficient mechanisms fo r influencing policy under a
binding NOTA system. Candidates would be forced to use real issues to get
their name out to the public. NOTA would also help third party candidates who
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cannot raise money like Republicans and Democrats. Everyone would enter the
special election on equal footing. The tim e constraints between the general
election and the special election would hamper party efforts to collect large cash
reserves. “Moneyed interests m ight not invest so heavily in incumbents if their
longevity was no longer guaranteed," asserts Hoover (1993).“

Less negative

advertising would foster campaigns based on the issues. NOTA would shift the
candidate’s focus from monetary contributions back to mobilizing the electorate.
A t the same tim e, NOTA would make it easier for citizens to gain accurate
political knowledge.
A system controlled by special interests and elites can not be considered
democratic. According to Ralph Nader
Nothing is more costly than unchallenged control o f nominations
and elections by what Thomas Jefferson calied the 'monied
interests.’ When Thomas Jefferson saw the purpose of
representative govemment as counteracting the excesses o f the
monied interests,’ he was recognizing that democracy’s central
point is to work on the maldistribution o f power and make it more
susceptible to reordering, challenge, displacement and where
particularly extreme, being outlawed. American history has marked
this progress by abolishing slavery and expanding the franchise to
include women and minorities. (NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down
to Size," 1996)“
Elected officials are obligated to take the wishes o f their constituents into account
if the process is to be considered democratic. Voting is merely symbolic if it does
not determine how a candidate w ill behave while in office. Rule by the people

“ Hoover, par. 6.
^ Ralph Nader, “NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down to Ske," In Policy Insights, par. 12,
16,17 [online Joumai] vol. 806 (May 1996 [cited 10 February 1999D; available from World Wide
Web @ http://www.nota.ora/Di806.htmr
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requires that voting must serve as a tool fo r enforcing accountability among
elected officials. “None o f these candidates” forces incumbents to address the
demands o f their constituents because it offers voters a viable altem ative to
elections traditionally dominated by career Democrats and Republicans.
According to Professor Amy:
The basic purpose of elections in the United States is to produce
legislative bodies that reflect the w ill of the people. [This] notion. . .
is central to most Americans conception of democracy. We believe
that the more representative such a body is, the more likely it is to
pass laws that embody the views o f the public—which is much o f
what democratic govemment is all about. . . The more
representative the legislature the more democratic the election
system. . . John Adams argued that legislatures in the United
States "should be an exact portrait, in miniature, o f the people at
large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like them . . . Our
voting system consistently violates this basic democratic principle; it
often produces legislatures that flail to accurately m irror the political
preferences o f the public (1993).^^
Representation occurs when policies change because of the w ill o f the
electorate. Since little representation actually takes place, those who disagree
with the policies supported by the two major parties never have a real chance to
see their opinions shape policies. If we want elections to act as tools o f
accountability, voters must be given the opportunity punish candidates who have
broken campaign promises and betrayed the public trust. NOTA supplies voters
with that opportunity when there is no opponent present or when the opponent is
too weak to provide any real challenge against the incumbent. Professor Pitney
suggests that, “if previoiusly unopposed incumbents started losing 20% or 30%
o f the vote to NOTA, they would be foolish not to reexamine what they were
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doing wrong," especially since, “a large NOTA vote would serve as an
unmistakeable sign o f incumbent vulnerability, thereby drawing strong
challengers into the next race" (Pitney, “The Right to Vote No," 1994) “
“Politicians wouid fear the ultimate humiliation o f losing an election to 'none o f the
above' and they would do anything in their power to avoid such a defeat," asserts
Pitney (Right to Vote No, 1994) “

Fear o f losing to NOTA may prompt politicians

to be more responsive to their constituents. Politicians would be forced to
consider the fact that a high percentage o f “none o f the above" votes would act
as a signal for better qualified challengers to enter the race against the
incumbent in the next election. NOTA would increase the chances of putting
representatives who are trustworthy in office by decreasing the role of money
and increasing the role o f accountability in the political system.

^ Douglas Amy, Real Choicest New Voices: The Case for Prooortfonat Representation
Elections in the United States (New York: Columbia UnNersity Press, 1993), 27.
28

I
Pitney,
T h e Right to Vote No," par. 13.

“ Ibid., par. 17.
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CHAPTER 4

ADOPTION PROCEDURES
In 1916, progressive Senator Robert Lafollette asserted that the people
should decide whether their nation should go to war instead o f allowing the
govemment to make a decision o f such great consequence. Lafollette’s plan
called for a national “war referendum” where the people would be able to change
the law through the process o f signing petitions and voting on the issue in a
federal election (Walsh and Kulman, 1996).^ W hile Lafollette may have won a
few battles over the national “w ar referendum," he certainly failed to win the war
because a national referendum was never enacted. Lafollette’s crusade is
relevant in the battle to get a binding form o f “none o f these candidates” on the
ballot because any measure, other than the adoption o f federal legislation
mandating NOTA in all elections, would have to be adopted a t the state level.
The consequence of state action is that the battle to get a binding “none of these
candidates” on the ballot would have to be waged separately in all fifty states.
The problem fo r NOTA advocates would be that only twenty^seven states
currently allow citizens to enact legislation through the initiative o r popular
referendum processes, but every state except Delaware has a mechanism in
' Kenneth T. Wafsh and Linda Kulman, ‘Bigfbotihg in Gucct Loafers: Let's Have the Voters do
more Lawmaking at the Ballot Box" in U.S. News&Worid Report oar. 1 idnline ioumafl vol. 121 (Decemiier
30,1996); avaiiabte from Wilson Select @ http:/Air8tsearch.ocfc.orQ
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place allowing citizens to vote for changes to the state constitution (Magelby,
1998).^ W hile the lack o f a national referendum makes the battle fo r the adoption
of a binding “none o f these candidates” law more difficult, it does not make the
battle impossible to win. Often, when an initiative or referendum is passed by
one state, media coverage o f the issue compels other states to enact sim ilar laws
(Magleby, 1998).®
Four years prior to Lafollette’s crusade for a “war referendum,” the Nevada
constitution was amended to allow citizens to directly initiate legislation (Heller,
1997).’* W hile the 1912 amendment promoted direct democracy by allowing
citizens to make laws, several safeguards were put into place to ensure that only
the m ost worthy initiatives would actually become law. The amendment required
ten percent o f the voters in thirteen o f Nevada’s seventeen counties to sign a
petition to put the issue on the ballot If the required signatures were obtained,
the initiative would appear on the ballot in the next two general elections. The
initiative would not become law unless it was approved by a m ajority o f the voters
In both elections. Between 1950 and 1997 sixty-five constitutional amendments
succeeded in the petition phase o f the initiative, but W ed to secure m ajority
approval in one or both o f the next two elections.® Fifty-five initiatives that did not
require constitutional amendment appeared on the ballot in the same tim e

^ David B. Magleby, ‘Ballot Initiatives and Intergovernmental Regulations in the United States,* in
Publius, par. 1 [electronicjOumall (Winter 1998 [cited 23 February 2000]); available from Wilson Select @
http://firstsearch.oclc.ora

® Ibid., par. 4.
*

Dean Heller, The Political History of Nevada 1996 (Carson City: SPO, 1997), 83,95.

® Ibid.. 83.
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frame.® Nevada's constitution allows citizens to change existing laws through the
referendum process, which has sim ilar requirements.
Initiative and referendum are the methods that would gamer the most
success in enacting a binding “none of these candidates” law. W hile it may be
possible to get binding NOTA passed through the legislature, it is unlikely that
such an attem pt would be successful. Legislative adoption would require NOTA
advocates to convince the legislature to undercut their own legislative authority
and reduce their reelection potential by enacting NOTA. Even if it were possible
to get the issue passed through the legislature, concessions would probably
require compromises to be made by NOTA advocates. The initiative and
referendum processes are superior to adoption by the legislature because they
allow NOTA proponents to determine the language used in the law and the
explanation o f the issue on the ballot.
The downside o f using the initiative and referendum processes is that
abuses o f these democratic devices have lead to widespread adoption of
initiatives and référendums promoted by big businesses and special interests
instead o f regular citizens. It is ironic that the tools progressive reformers used to
lim it the power o f special interests—initiatives and référendums—are the same
tools that special interests have embraced to make policy in the modem era.
Researchers found that 80 percent o f initiatives that became law in the 1980's
were won by the side that spent the most money promoting the issue (Mattson,

' Ibid.
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1999)7 Despite the tendency for money to dominate the initiative process,
“groups o f citizens who iack financial power can still organize and get their voices
heard, and sometimes even change laws” (Mattson, 1999)7
In order to effectively promote the NOTA initiative, advocates should bring
the issue to the public consciousness fo r debate. Addressing the issue in a
variety of forums such as newspaper and magazine editorials, radio and
television call in shows, letters to public officials, and websites offer cost effective
grassroots methods for bringing the issue to the attention o f the public.
Organizing citizen groups around the issue and soliciting monetary contributions
to advertise in the initiative campaign would also be necessary for success in
adopting a binding “none o f these candidates” law. The lack o f monetary support
behind the “none of these candidates" issue is often blamed forfeited NOTA
initiatives in Wyoming (1991), Colorado (1993), Michigan (1995), Ohio (1996),
Pennsylvania (1996), Arizona (1997) and Califom ia (1998), but the issue is
gaining momentum due to increased exposure.
Something must be done to resolve the crisis o f confidence that is brewing
in the American political system. Citizens m ust be connected to their
government so that democracy can function properly. A binding form o f the
“none o f these candidates” law is only one step in the right direction. White
NOTA may not be enough to solve the turnout problem on its own, it is a step
toward increasing citizen connectedness and voter participation. NOTA is a

^ Kevin Mattson, Taking back the initiattve: Renewing Progressive Democracy* in Soctai Policv.
par. 2 [online journal] vol. 29 no. 4 (Summer 1999); available from Wilson Select @ htto://firstsearch.ociaoro
* Mattson, par. 4.
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change in our electoral system that could increase partisanship, trust, efficacy,
and knowledge regarding politics by improving the pooi of candidates holding
political office and offering these candidates an incentive to reach out to the
public. While NOTA would change the structure o f American elections, the
change would not be disruptive because voters would be given the option of
selecting candidates as they do in the status quo or exercising a new privilege by
selecting NOTA. Nader estimates that “a binding NOTA would pass handily in
the nearly two dozen states that have initiative and referendum [procedures]
statewide" (“NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down to Size,” 1996).® The most
serious consequence facing a society that employs NOTA would be the cost o f a
special election, but the benefits of good govemment clearly outweigh the risks of
such costs. Experts like Steve Lilienthal say that, “voting for NOTA is an
expression o f the belief that citizens should be able to elect worthy leaders,”
because, “NOTA empowers voters to demand the best—not simply settle for
whatever they are given” (Lilienthal, “NOTA Movement,” 1998).*°
NOTA w ill increase our chances o f putting trustworthy politicians
back into office by decreasing the role o f money and increasing the role of
accountability in our political system. If we want elections to act as tools to
enforce accountability, voters must punish candidates who have broken
campaign promises and betrayed the pubiic trust. Voters cannot punish

® Ralph Nader, ‘NOTA: Cutting the Big Boys Down to Size,' in Policy Insights, par. 9, [online
Journal] vol. 806 (May 1996 [cited 10 February 1999D; available from World Wide Web @
htto:/Awww.nota.ora/bl806.htmf
Steve Lilienthal, "NOTA" Movement Working to Place "None of the Above' Option on the
Ballots,' par. 5. [Lkd. LPC Monthly February 1998—‘NOTA* Movement] (February 1998 [cited 2 July 1999]);
available fiom World Wide Web @ httDV/Www.ca.lo.oro/locm/9802-NOTA.htmt
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dishonest politicians when they are forced to choose between two dishonest
politicians. W hile it may be rational to choose the lesser o f two evils under the
circumstances, changes must be made to ensure that voters are not forced to
make that choice in the future. The first step toward increasing participation is
giving voters a real choice that makes a real difference. The “none of these
candidates" law accomplishes that goal.
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FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

1. Why not pass some other type of legislation (campaign finance reform,
term lim its, etc.) instead o f binding NOTA?

Binding NOTA does not have to exist exclusive of these other reforms, but It
is the only single measure that can address all o f these problems collectively.
Too many pieces o f legislation may overwhelm part time legislators and lead to
ineffective reform. Passing a binding NOTA resolution could buy the legislature
tim e to research whether other reforms would be necessary. Representatives
may also view binding NOTA as being less controversial than some o f these
other reforms. This may make it easier to push binding NOTA through the
legislature.

2. Why should we make changes when the system is not broken?

The rising number o f third party and “none o f these candidates" votes, the
decline in voter turnout and increasing cynicism about local politicians suggests
tha t there are problems with the political system that need to be addressed. In
effect, the system is broken and NOTA would be a step toward fixing it

66
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3. Why not ju st count non-voters?

Politicians do not take non-voters seriously. Elected officials often assume that
non-voters are content with the political system or they would show up at the
polls and try to change things. This assumption is Incorrect. People who are not
happy with their living situations due to poverty or other Actors usually do not
vote because they feel that there vote is not meaningful enough to change their
situation. Thus, non-voting is not an effective mechanism fo r withholding consent
from elected officials because it is often misinterpreted as contentment rather
than dissatisfaction.

4. W hat is wrong with using unconventional protest to demonstrate voter
dissatisfaction instead o f adopting NOTA?

It is difficult to organize unconventional protests among non-voters because they
constitute such a large and diverse portion o f society. Aside from the
organizational difficulties that non-voters would face in order to bring attention to
their protest, such protests may be misconstrued as protests against government
in general, protests against the office in general or protests against only one o f
several candidates on the b a llo t A binding “none o f these candidates" law
elim inates this confusion by allowing voters to clearly express their dissatisfaction
against a particular slate o f candidates in the election. Citizens should not be
forced to resort to unconventional protest in a democratic system. A binding
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“none o f these candidates” option would allow citizens to express their
dissatis^ction constructively so that a dialogue between citizens and politicians
can be established in order to solve problems with the political system without
creating unnecessary upheaval.

5. Why shouldn't NOTA appear on special election ballots?

My decision not to include NOTA on special election ballots is a compromise that
may be necessary to secure approval from state legislators who are concerned
with the costs o f numerous special elections. W hile it is unlikely that citizens
would choose NOTA over the candidate list in special elections, opponents worry
that the monetary costs of several special elections would outweigh the benefits
o f NOTA legislation. Filling the vacant office is less o f a concern because the
Nevada constitution allows the govemor to temporarily appoint someone to fill
the vacant office until another special election can be held.

6. What if NOTA backfires and increases the amount o f money necessary to
run a successful campaign?

The argument that NOTA w ill decrease money in political campaigns is based
on three A ctors; the incumbency factor, the surprise ^ c to r and the timing factor.
The incumbency ^ c to r is based on the idea tha t if incumbents are not re-elected
as often in a binding NOTA system, people w ill be less likely to invest so much
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money in their candidacies. The surprise factor relies on the fact that parties w ill
not know In advance which races w ill have a special election or If any special
elections w ill be held at all. Thus, political parties could either save some o f their
campaign contributions fo r the special election (if it occurs) or spend all o f their
money on the first candidate and hope that he does not lose to NOTA. The first
scenario provides less money involved in most campaigns because most races
will not require expenses fo r a special election. The second alternative reflects
the state o f political expenditures In the status quo. Either way, we don’t see
extra fundraising for the special election. The timing factor reflects that there is
only one month between the regular election and the special election. One
month does not give parties much time to raise money and it is likely that these
campaigns would be characterized less by political advertisements and more by
media attention drawn by a NOTA victory in the first election.
Since NOTA would make candidates a less marketable investment, it is
possible that NOTA would decrease candidate contributions and increase party
building contributions that could be used to market new candidates in the special
election. Due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo that political
spending is the equivalent o f political speech, no campaign finance reform
legislation, other than a constitutional amendment outlawing soft money
contributions, can guarantee that the money used in political campaigns w ill not
be filtered over into the soft money category. Since people would be able to
choose NOTA whenever they lack political information about a list o f candidates,
binding NOTA legislation increases the likelihood that campaign contributions w ill
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be spent fnfomriing citizens about the issues o f the campaign instead o f just
getting the candidate’s name o u t NOTA w ill always have more name
recognition than the other candidates so candidates w ill have to run informative
campaigns to beat NOTA. If we cannot say that NOTA w ill decrease the amount
o f money spent in political campaigns, we can still say that It w ill ensure that the
money spent In political campaigns is better spent to educate the public about
the candidates. The benefits o f adopting NOTA legislation, even without the
argument that It decreases campaign spending, would still outweigh these costs.
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